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Le Home Rule, la démocratie et la déconstruction du Royaume-Uni, 1885-1921
Eugenio Biagini
“What fools we were … not to have accepted Mr
Gladstone’s Home Rule Bill. The Empire would not
now have the Irish Free State giving us so much
trouble and pulling us to pieces.”




1 From  1885  to  1921  United  Kingdom  politics  were  polarized  around  the  question  of
parliamentary devolution for Ireland (Home Rule). Although the relevant Bills offered
only a modest measure of devolution, a major argument against Home Rule was that it
would have been incompatible with the survival of the British Empire and indeed of the
United  Kingdom,  because  sovereignty  could  not  be  divided.  However,  Home  Rule
supporters insisted that the proposal was in the Irish national interest. This claim was in
itself divisive in Ireland, as well as within the United Kingdom as a whole, and set the
South  against  Ulster,  which  by  1912  was  (literally)  up  in  arms  against  any  idea  of
weakening or diluting the Union with Britain. By 1887 Liberals in both Scotland and (soon
afterwards)  in  Wales  started  to  campaign  for  their  own form of  Home  Rule.  Indian
Liberals were the next to take up the issue, when Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917), the Indian
Liberal Federation and eventually Congress started to demand Home Rule for the Raj.1
Ostensibly only an Irish question, Home Rule was in fact the beginning of a wider debate
about the governance of  the United Kingdom and the tension between a centralized
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political system and the claims of ethnic groups and distinct regions in a multi-national
state – a problem then shared by other multi-ethnic empires in Europe.2 
2 This article examines the wider significance of the crisis in the constitutional rebalancing
of a liberal, but still undemocratic, state. It will start from the time when the British
system was at its apex, between 1707 and 1885. In this period parliament provided social
and cultural legitimacy for the centralization of power and created cohesion for the wider
imperial project. Second, this article will focus on the advent of democracy from 1885,
and the way the latter made it more difficult for parliament to agree on the national




3 When England and Scotland merged their parliaments in 1707, neither country was a
democracy.  The  British  parliamentary  system  was  one  in  which  men  of  property
exercised real influence not only in electing MPs, but also in the selection of candidates
and, most importantly, in identifying those issues about which the government should be
concerned. The House of Commons was dominated by large landowners, including the
gentry and cadet members of the nobility, some sitting there while waiting their turn to
be elevated to the House of Lords upon inheriting the family title.  The Upper House
represented most of the country’s wealth and hereditary confidence in dealing with both
national and global affairs. 
4 Parliament played a key role in the forging of a sense of national identity and interest.
For several months each year over 600 commoners and a variable number of territorial
peers met in the Houses of Parliament to debate matters of common concern; this helped
to create  a  lively  awareness  of  what  Benedict  Anderson calls  the  national  ‘imagined
community’.  It  was  an  effective  way  of  conjuring  up  a  collective  entity  which
encompassed not only the British Isles, but also the wider Empire, whose affairs became a
topic of continuous and informed debate. In this way, Parliament created a sense of the
‘national  interest’.  It  was  important  that  they  met  in  London,  which  was  also  the
country’s commercial and financial centre, as well as the hub of imperial communication,
where  information  could  be  put  to  good  use  in  terms  of  choosing  investments  and
shaping policies which would maximize profits. Cohesion among the elite was further
consolidated  by  the  development  of  an  integrated  education  system based  on  public
schools, Oxford and Cambridge. Such cultural centralization helps to understand also why
the country could function without a written constitution: the key factor was the cultural
and  social  homogeneity  of  the  ruling  elite.  The  United  Kingdom  was  governed  by
hereditary experts, organic intellectuals of the landed elite and the upper middle class,
confident to be, and be regarded as, essential to the correct operation of a system whose
rules  were  not  so  much  “unwritten”,  as  “hidden  amidst  a  mass  of  legal  precedent  and
conventions.”3 
5 Though undemocratic, this system was broadly representative. It did not represent citizens
and popular majorities, but empowered the people of weight and influence. Even the House
of Lords was representative in this sense: each of its members was based in one or more
territorial estates, and had personal reasons for looking after the economic interests of
those areas where they were located. Furthermore, as a group, they included the great
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shareholders in the Empire project, even in the literal sense of the expression, because of
their investments in India, North America and the West Indies.4 
6 Their uniquely ‘global’ perspective on the ‘national interest’ provided also the rationale
behind the development  of  the so-called ‘Court  Party’  in  the eighteenth century.  Its
supporters were motivated by their involvement in international trade and other global
economic  interests,  which  needed  to  be  defended  against  competitors.  They  were
prepared to fight wars and inflict high taxation on the country for this purpose. They
were successful because many other social groups benefited from such a policy, including
those associated with the city ports, the ship-building industry, the merchant marine, the
navy and its employees, and – last but not least – the slave trade lobby. 
7 By contrast, the smaller gentry, whose outlook was based primarily in one specific area,
articulated a landed patriotism, which identified the national interest with those of the
farming interest. At the time, agriculture was by far the largest employer in the country,
and was best  served by cheap government and low taxation,  which required a small
military establishment and the reduction of the national debt – both of which depended
on peace abroad. Its advocates, the Country Party, were concerned with the perceived shift
of the balance of power from Parliament to the Prime Minister and sought to reassert the
power of the landed gentry in contrast to royal officials, large merchants and bankers.5 
8 What turned the scales in favour of  the Court  Party and globalization as the winning
definition of the national interest were, first, the great military successes of the eighteenth
century, culminating in the securing of new territories in both North America and India
after 1760;  and,  second, the industrial  revolution.  In turn,  empire and industrialization
sparked off a long period of expansion of the British economy, including the financial
sector, which was the backbone of British power abroad. Great Britain became a focal
point for industry and empire, sustaining unprecedented demographic growth at home
and what James Belich describes as the settler revolution in colonies overseas, with millions
of emigrants creating new countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand.67 
9 The  stability  of  the  settler  system  was  ensured  by  the  adoption  of  devolved
representative government for the colonies.  Described by Jürgen Osterhammel as the
most  important  constitutional  document  in  nineteenth-century  global  history,  the
Durham Report (1839) initiated a process of rapid, albeit selective and racially-exclusive,
democratization of the world, starting from the periphery of Europe.8 From the 1840s,
there emerged a division of labour between Westminster and colonial governments. The
latter were allowed to manage colonial affairs and were responsible to locally elected
representative assemblies. This in turn consolidated a two-way flow between foreign and
domestic policies: throughout the Victorian age and during the first half of the twentieth
century, in exchange for devolution, the Australia, Canada, New Zealand and (later) the
‘white’ colonies in Africa accepted London's control over their commercial and foreign
policy. It was democracy made harmless for the ancien régime, democracy without power.
10 Yet, in India, the so-called “Mutiny” (or “War of Independence”) of 1857-8 demonstrated the
limits of paternalism. Ultimately, as Richard Evans has recently reminded us, ‘violence lay
at the heart of the British Empire.’9 Indeed, this was well known at the time. As the most
‘realist’ among the system’s champions, James Fitzjames Stephen, noted in 1874, in India
as much as in Canada or the Scottish Highlands,  peace,  law and order depended not
primarily on consent, but on force, and “the reason why it work[ed] so quietly is that no one
doubt[ed]  either  its  existence,  or  its  direction,  or  its  crushing  superiority  to  any  individual
resistance which could be offered to it.”10 However, this undemocratic system was restrained
Home Rule, Democracy and the Unmaking of the United Kingdom, 1885-1921
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXIV-2 | 2019
3
by a liberal society: domestic public opinion had to be handled with care – which resulted
in the early development of a complex relationship between the media and power, as
John Wong has demonstrated in his splendid study of the 1856 Opium War.11
11 The weak link in the imperial chain was Ireland. From 1800 its Union with Britain should
have  provided  the  country  with  new  opportunities  by  associating  it  with  the  most
dynamic economy and the widest territorial and commercial empire on earth. In practice,
however,  the groups which most benefited from imperial  globalisation represented a
small  cross  section  of  society,  while  the  numerically  largest  group  were  the  tenant
farmers,  whose interests were rooted in ‘the land’  and confined to their villages and
counties.  The  problem was  not,  as  Irish  nationalists  insisted,  that  Ireland’s  ‘national
interest’ diverged from those Britain. Rather – in a variation on the old theme of ‘Court
versus Country’ – in both Ireland and Britain there was a clash between the interests of the
farmers and those of the business elite and the urban working classes. These were less
important in south-west Ireland than in Britain, but very important both in Ulster and
the  south-east  of  Ireland,  particularly  Dublin.  Furthermore,  while  Belfast  had  every
reason to  cherish  the  Union because  its  interests  coincided  with  those  of  industrial
Britain, Dublin was divided. Its commercial interests converged with those of England,
the largest market for Irish distilleries and confectionary, but the old political elite were
resentful of Dublin’s loss of status as capital after the Act of Union.12 This helps to explain
the  strange  phenomenon  of  an  Irish  Protestant  ‘Tory’  patriotism,  an  attitude  best
exemplified by Charles Stewart Parnell (1846-91).
12 The debate on free trade versus agricultural protection was the ideological centrepiece of
this clash. During the Napoleonic wars, both British and Irish farmers had benefited from
high food prices and steady domestic demand. Through tariffs on imported wheat (the
1815  Corn  Laws)  the  government  sought  to  continue  these  conditions  when  peace
returned. However, labour unrest and the pressure of the industrial lobby (both of which
demanded cheap agricultural imports) forced London to revise the Corn Laws throughout
the 1820s and 1830s. Persuaded that free trade was essential to rebalance the economy
and avoid revolution, in 1842 the Prime Minister Robert Peel made further steps towards
a reduction of agricultural tariffs and in 1846 he pushed through the repeal of the Corn
Laws, although this decision split his Conservative party and brought to an end his own
political career. While freer trade benefited urban dwellers, it damaged farmers, who did
not usually buy their own food, but produced what they needed for family consumption
and sold the surplus on the market.  Ireland had the largest  number of  small  tenant
farmers in the United Kingdom and here the backlash was immediate: the 1842 free trade
budget  moved  hundreds  of  thousands  of  poor  farmers  to  coalesce  around  Daniel
O’Connell’s campaign for the Repeal of the Union. O’Connell linked the Union with free
trade  and  a  restoration  of  a  parliament  in  Dublin  with  protection  and  the  farmers’
interest.13 
13 His campaign was abruptly stopped by the greatest economic social and humanitarian
catastrophe in the history of the Victorian United Kingdom: the Great Famine (1845-50),
which caused the death of about one million people, the immediate exodus of another
million and continued emigration over the long term. Survivors, especially those who
joined  the  Irish  diaspora  in  Anglo-phobic,  republican  America,  concluded  –  not
unreasonably – that the United Kingdom did not work for Ireland and that Britain was the
main cause of Ireland’s woes.14 What may be surprising is that this view was not more
widely shared by either the Irish who did not emigrate or those in British colonies, such as
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Australia and Canada. One explanation is that a new pattern developed for which Irish
and  British  ‘national’  interests  –  and  the  interest  of  farmers  and  city-dwellers  –
converged for at least two generations. The years from 1850 until to 1875 saw a large-
scale, rapid economic expansion and growth in real wages and living standards sustained
by the increase in British demand for Irish corn, beef and butter. Meanwhile, industrial
output in Ulster skyrocketed, particularly in shipbuilding, coal and textiles.15 However,
from the late 1870s improvement in transcontinental and transatlantic communication
meant that imported American farm produce started to bring down agricultural prices
and erode  the  Irish  share  of  the  United  Kingdom market.  When this  happened,  the
interests  of  the  rural  regions  started  to  diverge  again  from those  of  urbanized  and
industrial  areas.  While the latter were benefiting from plummeting food prices,  Irish
farmers felt that their hard-won prosperity was now threatened and demanded a political
solution:  land redistribution and agricultural  protectionism.  This  helped to reawaken
nationalism. In such revival religion was a contributing factor, but hardly a decisive one,
for the Catholic hierarchy was predominantly aligned with the British government and
committed to the preservation of peace, law and order.
 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft
14 The situation in Scotland was comparable, but the outcome was different. Here too there
was potential for a revival of Scottish nationalism with significant religious differences,
particularly  in  the  aftermath  of  the  1843  clash  between the  Presbyterian  Church of
Scotland (the Kirk) and the state over lay patronage in the appointment of ministers. A
majority of the Kirk’s supreme governing body – the General Assembly, with both lay and
clerical representatives – deliberated that ministers should be elected by congregations,
without  interference from the local  gentry.  However,  the British Prime Minister  (Sir
Robert Peel) refused to accept such decision. The General Assembly protested that this
was  in  breach  of  the  1707  Act  of  Union.  Their  argument  was  rooted  in  Scottish
constitutional  and legal  thinking –  that  “the  Kirk  was  an  entrenched part  of  the  British
constitution,  beyond  the  reach  of  parliament”,  because  the  1707  Act  of  Union  was  “a
fundamental law of both realms”; and therefore “no infringement [could] be made upon that
[Kirk] establishment without breach of the Union.”16 In other words, Scotland was understood
to  have  a  ‘written’  constitution,  the  Act  of  Union,  which,  moreover,  provided  the
‘covenanted’ foundation of the United Kingdom as a whole. This was a view for which
there was much popular support: one minister recalled exclaiming, “on the spur of the
moment, that such injustice was enough to justify Scotland in demanding the repeal of the Union.
With that,  to my surprise,  the meeting rose as one man,  waving hats and handkerchiefs,  and
cheering again and again.”17 In what became known as the Great Disruption, about two
fifths of the total membership of the established church seceded to set up a ‘Free’ Kirk. 
15 While the Disruption did not generate a politically nationalist movement as such, it was “
one occasion when hundreds of thousands of ordinary men and women in Scotland challenged the
authority  set  over  them.  And,  unlike  other  Scottish rebellions,  it  succeeded,  up to  a  point.”18
Because it was not based on violence, but on the representative legitimacy of the Kirk’s
governing body, it attracted broad support – especially in the North, which had least
benefited from the Union. The Free Kirk became solidly Liberal (and the Scottish Liberals
a surrogate Scottish nationalist party). Within forty-five years of the Disruption Scots
started to demand the restoration of their parliament in Edinburgh.19
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16 Scottish nationalism failed to develop along the lines of its Irish counterpart for three
main reasons. The first is that at the time Scotland was unquestionably benefiting from
both rapid industrialization and urbanization on a scale which was much larger than that
experienced  by  Ireland.  While  in  Ireland  industrialization  remained  confined  to  the
northeast, the industrial belt in Scotland accounted for that country’s largest centres of
population  and  wealth  and  played  a  major  role  in  steering  the  national  economy.
Moreover, Scotland was profiting much more than Ireland from unfettered access to the
global markets created by imperial expansion. The latter drove industrial development
(shipbuilding, coalmines, textiles) and created overseas employment opportunities (in the
army, navy and services, in the education sector and for university graduates, especially
medics, law graduates, missionaries and theologians).
17 In 1707, when the Scottish Act of Union was passed, there were many reasons for Scotland
and England to form a Union,  including questions of  national  security and economic
interest.  In 1800 there were equally good reasons for the Union between Britain and
Ireland: again, top of the list was national security against the threat of a French invasion,
a prospect which was alarming not only for the British government, but also for the Irish
Catholic hierarchy, aware of the policies implemented by the French against the Church
and the Pope himself.20 It was, however, not a popular decision: in 1800, in order to secure
the level of parliamentary support necessary to form a Union, Irish MPs and members of
the  House  of  Lords  had  to  be  bribed  and  bullied,  while  their  electors  were  never
consulted. Had they been, it is unlikely that they would have voted for the Union, because
ethnic suspicion of the English ran deep and was compounded by religious differences
and the fear of Dublin’s economic decline. In 1707, the Scottish Union had encountered
similar objections and resistance, which had been overcome in similar ways.21 
18 There were three major risings between in 1715 and 1798. The Scottish Jacobite rebellions
of 1715 and 1745-46 pitched the supporters of the Stuarts (the royal family which had
been deposed in 1689) against those of the Hanovers (the Protestant dynasty which had
by then produced its first two Georges). The related wars were more brutal and complex
than dynastic conflict because they involved a clash between the traditional, kinship-
based  system  of  social  obligation  of  the  Highlands,  and  the  market-oriented  and
globalizing society of Glasgow and Edinburgh.22 Popular support for these rebellions had
much  to  do  with  the  Union’s  failure  to  integrate  the  less  commercialized,  less
monetarized parts of Scotland. However, in the end, the economic interests of the large
farmers,  the  city  merchants,  the  shopkeepers  and  all  those  involved  –  directly  or
indirectly – with the huge and growing overseas trade, demanded the consolidation of the
Union. After the Scottish Jacobites were crushed at Culloden (1746), the persistence of
tangible external threats, particularly from France (especially from 1756-1816), helped to
create a state of patriotic fervor, which consolidated the Union and the insular, ‘sea-
borne’ chauvinism. 
19 In Ireland, the 1798 United Irishmen’s rebellion was more complex, because here the
initiative  started  not  from a  foreign  prince  or  a  group  of  clan  chieftains,  but  from
republican elites  strongly  represented in  large  towns  and cities,  such as  Belfast  and
Dublin.23 They were animated by Gesellschaft-oriented ideas of ‘universal human rights’
and secular democracy. However, after the early stage of the rising, these groups were
unable  to  control  peasant  insurgency,  which  again  asserted  Gemeinschaft values  –
including land hunger and sectarian revenge – against the local representatives of wider,
if not global, interests. They were brutally put down by the British army with the help of
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the local militias, both Catholic and Protestant, staffed by more prosperous farmers and
with the blessings of all the churches.24
20 Of the two Unions, the Irish one was the less stable for two main reasons. The first is that
here the Union had arrived at a time when the Atlantic democratic revolution was well
under way (the Irish themselves played a key role in it).25 And, the second was because of
the way Catholic ‘emancipation’ (full political rights for Catholics) was achieved in 1829: it
was granted by an unwilling government, apparently scared by popular protest – i.e., by
democracy.  This  established  a  dangerous  precedent  for  the  United  Kingdom:  for,  if
popular  agitation  and  the  threat  of  violence  had  ‘forced’  the  government  to  grant
Catholic emancipation, surely more popular unrest would secure anything else the people
wanted?
21 The Great Famine killed off domestic revolutionary aspirations for a generation.26 As we
have seen, after 1850 Ireland was benefiting from the British-led economic boom which
continued until the mid-1870s. Towards the end of that decade, however, a series of bad
crops, the steady fall in agricultural prices, with most landlords continuing to demand
their  rents,  brought  about  a  new crisis.  Under  the leadership of  a  Catholic  socialist,
Michael  Davitt,  and a Protestant  aristocrat,  Parnell,  a  major new political  movement
emerged. Parnell’s aim was to secure the restoration of a parliament in Dublin, which he
regarded as  vital  to  the  interest  of  his  own class,  the  southern Irish gentry,  but  he
presented it as a nationalist demand. Crucially, like Daniel O’Connell in 1842, he linked
parliamentary  reform  to  the  farmers’  interests.27 Davitt  would  have  preferred  a
programme based on co-operative farming,  but realized that there was little popular
support and great ecclesiastical and middle-class opposition to any form of socialism, and
was pragmatic enough to decide that the only way forward was to endorse Parnell’s
demand for ‘tenant right’ and Home Rule.
 
The Advent of ‘democracy’
22 Much of Parnell’s social programme was promptly accepted by the British government.
The Prime Minister William E. Gladstone (1809-98) was eager to restore peace, law, order
and the legitimacy of the Union. He first targeted the tenant right agitation with radical
land reform Acts, the most important of which, in 1881, established what contemporaries
called “the Three Fs.” These included “fair rents”, adjudicated by special courts, rather than
defined by market demand and supply mechanisms; “fixity of tenure”, in that a farmer
could be evicted only for non-payment of the rent; and a tenant’s right to “free sale” of the
improvements which he had carried out on the farm if he decided to leave it. Land reform
was accompanied by a renewal of ‘coercion’ (anti-terrorist legislation),  which became
increasingly  draconian  after  Gladstone’s  nephew,  Lord  Frederick  Cavendish,  was
murdered by a Fenian group in Dublin’s Phoenix Park on the day of his arrival as Ireland’s
Chief Secretary (6 May 1882).28
23 Such measures were followed by electoral reforms, together amounting to the single most
important step towards democracy in a century. The United Kingdom was brought under
a uniform electoral system, with (predominantly) single-member constituencies and a
first-past-the-post system under household franchise, without property qualifications. It
was a sort of ‘patriarchal’ democracy, under which male heads of households voted, while
younger men living at home or in shared accommodation did not.  Women were also
excluded (though they could vote in some local elections, for example for the powerful
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school boards).  In Ireland, the democratic significance of these electoral reforms was
increased by the fact that they had been preceded by land reform.
24 It was supposed to be a new deal for Ireland, one which would make the Union work for
the Irish.  Instead,  it  was the beginning of the end of the Union between Britain and
Ireland. This was not primarily because Ireland suffered more than England as a result of
the decline in agricultural prices, but mainly because, for the first time, ‘the people’ were
consulted about the Union. At the 1885 general election, the Liberals – the party which
wanted to make the Union work for the Irish – were squeezed out of Ireland. Most of the
southern and western constituencies and about half of the Ulster seats went to Parnell’s
National party, which demanded Home Rule, while most of north-east Ulster went to the
Conservative party, which wanted no further change.29
25 This democratic revolt against the Union was not merely an Irish phenomenon: in the
Scottish Highlands a new movement arose, the Crofters’ party. Demanding radical land
reform on the Irish model, they threatened the Liberal hold over on the north-west. In
Wales,  the land question mobilized the predominantly Nonconformist  tenant farmers
against Anglican landlords, while a new Welsh-speaking movement, Cymru Fydd,  made
inroads into the Liberal party, calling for land reform, Church disestablishment and Home
Rule for Wales.30 
26 In  response  to  such developments  the  two main  parties  adopted radically  divergent
policies. Gladstone was keenly aware of the power of national separatism and believed
that it was important to find a strategy to harness it to the chariot of the Union state. He
thought that this could best be done through devolution and land reform. For Scotland,
he quickly established the Scottish Office, as a new central government department, and
implemented a Highlands Land Act similar to the 1881 Irish Land Act to appease the
Scottish  small  farmers  (crofters)  had  started  an  agitation  in  1885.31 Wales,  where
Gladstone had his own country house,  would have to wait,  but Ireland was the most
urgent dimension of the Union problem, because of the political clout secured by Parnell,
whose party now held the balance at Westminster. In 1886 Gladstone proposed further
land  reform  –  effectively,  a  government-sponsored,  large-scale  transfer  of  land
ownership from the landed gentry to the farmers – and the establishment of a devolved
parliament in Dublin. It was a bold, two-pronged attempt to stabilize the United Kingdom:
land reform would create a class of contented, conservative smallholders, while Home
Rule  would  satisfy  the  nationalists’  demands  and  establish  institutional  mechanisms
which in future would articulate Irish ‘national  interest’,  but do so within the wider
British Empire.32 It was an integrationist strategy with an explicit pluralist agenda: the
United Kingdom consisted of different nations, and their difference was to be affirmed as
a means of re-establishing the United Kingdom’s overall cohesion. It was reassuring that
electoral ‘democracy’ was mediated through the intrinsically moderate, exclusively male
householder  electorate.  Gladstone  hoped  that  this  partial  coopting  of  democratic
impulses and provincial interests would stabilize the system, in the same way that the
adoption of the Durham Report had consolidated the Empire after 1840.
27 Under Lord Salisbury, the Conservative party adopted the opposite strategy, based on an
assimilationist philosophy:  they  denounced  Home  Rule  as  the  first  step  towards  the
disintegration of the Empire and argued that the way forward demanded not constitutional
, but primarily social reform within a centralized United Kingdom – making Ireland more
like England, in so far as it was possible. One big advantage of this strategy was that it was
consistent with the jingoistic spirit of the age and enjoyed widespread support in ‘middle
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England’. More importantly, Salisbury’s stand helped to split the Liberal party in 1886,
with the anti-Home Rule  wing abandoning Gladstone and entering into what  was  to
become a permanent ‘Unionist’ alliance with the Conservative party, one which proved a
lasting success and was in office for most of the time from 1886 to 1905.33 Interestingly,
the Liberal  seceders’  most  dynamic leader,  the social  imperialist  Joseph Chamberlain
(1836-1914), was influenced by the French republican model of social imperialism, which
at the time was the most assimilationist in Europe.34 Driven by a Darwinian angst about
the competition between great powers – Germany, France, Russia, the USA and Britain –
Chamberlain  wanted  to  build  a  stronger  and  more  united  Empire  applying  to  it  a
collectivist and interventionist philosophy.35 
28 In Ireland,  in response to national  separatism,  the Conservative and Liberal  Unionist
governments (1886-92 and1895-1905) tried to establish a higher synthesis of what the
national interest might mean. For this purpose they started to address the Irish question
as one requiring two answers: on the one hand, defeating national separatism and
agrarian  terrorism;  on  the  other,  modernizing  the  country.36 Their  land  policy  was
generous and radical, culminating, in 1903, with the Wyndham Land Act. This was the
final instalment of the sort of land purchase that Gladstone would have wished to carry
out  through  one  comprehensive  big  law  in  1886.  Salisbury  and  his  governments
implemented  the  same  policy  gradually  over  nearly  twenty  years.  Meanwhile,  they
adopted  repressive  legislation  to  control  rural  unrest.  Such  ‘Constructive’  Unionism
commanded  a  solid  majority  at  Westminster  and  became  skilled  in  ‘surfing’  the
imperialist wave, which by 1900 appeared unstoppable. By then, they also believed that
they had solved the problem of how to ‘manage’ a democratic electorate by avoiding the
inconveniences of democracy: this required addressing some of the causes of economic
instability and popular anxiety, while unifying ‘England’ against ‘the enemy within’ –
Irish nationalists and Gladstonian Liberals – allegedly intent on destroying the Empire. 
29 However, there were two problems with this strategy. The first was that, while Ireland
was small and affordable, if ‘Constructive’ Unionist reforms were applied to the rest of
the United Kingdom, they would become very expensive.37 For example, Chamberlain had
long wished to  introduce old-age pensions.  The latter  would require  new sources  of
revenue, which would could come either from taxing more heavily the income of the
wealthy  (a  strategy  which  was  not  popular  with  the  Conservative  party),  or  the
consumption of the poor (which was unacceptable to their electors). The second problem
was  that  whatever  the  government  did  for  the  Irish,  it  was  never  enough,  because
nationalists were not demanding better government from London, but self-government,
whether good or bad.
30 The Liberals, who returned to power in 1906, had a different view. Gladstone was by then
dead, but his party inherited and further developed his vision of the empire not as a
unitary entity run by a London elite, but as a partnership of four nations, involving the
emerging regional elites in the redefinition of both British and Irish interests through
devolved  legislative  assemblies.38 Indeed,  by  1912  Winston  Churchill  was  working  a
project of ‘Home Rule All Round’, with devolved assemblies for both Scotland and Wales
and the English ‘regions’.39 Furthermore, this was a dynamic strategy in the sense that it
could be extended beyond the United Kingdom to coopt the colonial  elites  overseas.
Indeed, in 1910 this strategy was successfully implemented in the then newly-established
Union of South Africa,  where it  worked wonders by reconciling most of the defeated
Boers  to  British rule,  so  much so,  that  one of  their  leaders,  Jan Smuts,  immediately
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became  a  leading  figure  in  Liberal  empire-building.  However,  the  Liberals’  renewed
attempt to apply devolution to Ireland in 1912 resulted in a major constitutional crisis.40 
31 Two things are remarkable in the constitutional crises of 1911-14: the first is that both
the British and the Irish electorate had a keener interest in the Home Rule Question and
the future of the Union, than in either radical social reform (including non-contributory
old age pensions, introduced by the Liberals in 1908)41 or the ending of the House of
Lords’ veto on legislation passed by the elected House of Commons. The second is that
Home Rule was stopped not by parliamentary means but by a ‘popular’ insurrection in
Ulster: in September 1912, after a well-orchestrated campaign, about half-a-million Ulster
men  and  women  signed  two  parallel documents  committing  them  to  resist  the
establishment of a devolved parliament in Dublin by all means. They claimed ‘that Home
Rule would be disastrous to the material well-being of Ulster as well as of the whole of Ireland,
subversive of our civil and religious freedom, destructive of our citizenship, and perilous to the
unity of the Empire’ (Solemn League and Covenant). Their threat was further upheld by the
mobilization of a private army, the Ulster Volunteers, which in itself implied a claim to
ultimate sovereignty, the right to use force, the ius ad bellum.42 Inevitably, the Nationalists
responded by forming their own private army, the Irish Volunteers. In the spring of 1914
the island, indeed the United Kingdom as a whole, seemed on the brink of civil war when
both Unionists and Nationalists started to import weapons from abroad, while the British
army was in a state of quasi-mutiny.43
32 A few months later, the outbreak of the First World War changed everything. Britain and
Ireland went into the war as ‘a Kingdom united’, and furthermore remained so over the
next  few  years.44 As  it  had  already  happened  a  hundred  years  earlier,  during  the
Napoleonic Wars, for the duration of the 1914-18 war the United Kingdom held together
well, despite the widely publicized 1916 Easter Rising. The German blockade and threat of
an invasion created a solidarity that went beyond the question of the Union.45 The real
turning point came only with the next general election in December 1918. For the first
time, all adult males and some women above the age of thirty were entitled to vote. The
election found Ireland more polarized than ever. In the south, a new nationalist party,
Sinn Féin,  won the  overwhelming majority  of  the  seats  but  refused to  send MPs  to
Westminster and instead organized an independent republican parliament in Dublin, the
first Dáil. The Unionists reaffirmed their control over the six northeast counties of Ulster.
They were determined to retain Ulster’s  connection to the United Kingdom.  In both
Irelands electors voted not in favour of a programme, but against some ‘enemy’ – either
Britain (in the nationalist south) or republican nationalism (in North-East Ulster), and
this  resulted  in  the  squeezing  out  of  the  system  of  any  parties  which  proposed
compromise answers to the self-government questions, including the old National party
and the moderate Unionists. Likewise, socialism, the politics of ‘class struggle’ and its
Irish Labour party advocates were completely marginalized: in the South this outcome
emerged  despite,  or  because  of,  the  support  the  party  had  offered  to  the  national
revolution. 
33 Over the next two years such division was consolidated into territorial partition, In the
South and the West, 26 Counties formed an economically conservative ‘Free State’, after a
revolution (1919-23) which created a bourgeois/farmer state whose economic and social
policies combined late-Victorian liberal laissez-faire with Catholic social teaching.46 In the
six north-eastern counties of Ulster the British government created a new self-governing
jurisdiction – Northern Ireland. Partition excluded from Northern Ireland three Ulster
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counties where the nationalist vote and the Catholic populations were stronger (Donegal,
Moneghan and Cavan). This was an attempt to secure homogeneity and stability for the
new Province which became one of the first examples of what sociologists call ‘ethnic
democracy’.47 Partition  was  formalized  by  the  decisions  of  the  1925  Boundary
commission, which effectively confirmed the border between the two Irish jurisdictions.48
34 Elsewhere in Britain the first quasi-universal suffrage election was far less decisive. The
war had created a sense of national solidarity against both external enemies and new
internal ones: with the Bolshevik Revolution threatening to spread to Central and even
Western Europe, a majority of the British electors voted to stop what they regarded the
most dangerous ‘enemy within’, identified not with the Irish separatists, but the British
‘socialists’. This resulted in the traditional parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals,
being confirmed as the dominant forces. However, the Liberal party was divided again, as
in 1886, between the majority, which followed the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George,
into a Coalition with the Conservatives; and a minority, which followed the former Prime
Minister H. H. Asquith and remained faithful to pre-war Liberalism. The Labour party
made some inroads, but remained largely marginal. 49
 
Conclusions
35 Whatever happened to Scottish and Welsh aspirations to devolution? Between 1910 and
the 1920s in Scotland there continued to be interest in the idea, until a series of economic
crises and terminal industrial decay increased the country’s dependence on London. This
was paralleled by the decline of the Liberal party – the greatest champions of devolution
–  which  lost  support  to  Labour  and  the  Unionist  party  (as  the  Conservatives  called
themselves north of the border). The Unionists were helped by the Protestant churches,
deserting the Liberals when faced with the prospect of the rise of a ‘socialist’, ‘Godless’
(or, worse, Irish Catholic) Labour party. Thus Scotland united against its own variety of
the  ‘enemy  within’.  Meanwhile  Wales  had  been  temporarily  absorbed  in  ‘unionist’
politics, first by David Lloyd George – himself the greatest Welsh statesman ever50 – and
then by the vigorous development of the Labour party. The latter owed more to Joseph
Chamberlain than to Karl Marx and ‘Constructive Unionism’ became and remained their
strategy until 1998.
36 Thus,  from 1707  to  1885  a  representative,  but  undemocratic,  system of  government,
renewed the legitimacy of the ruling landed elite,  while continuous economic growth
strengthened popular deference towards them. Unity and a sense of common purpose
depended  on  lack  of  democracy,  which  allowed  for  a  drastic  simplification  of  the
‘interests’ that mattered and needed to be considered in framing policy. These interests
were primarily those of the landed elite and their local supporters. They were more or
less effectively represented in parliament, which gave a voice to the wealthy without
excluding  regional  differences  thus  managing  ‘Court  versus  Country’  tensions  while
simultaneously encouraging the formation and renewal of a national United Kingdom
elite. 
37 From 1885, with the gradual advent of democracy, parliamentary centralization became
contentious, and this resulted first in the break-up of the party system (1886), and then in
near civil  war (1914),  and eventually the Partition of  Ireland (1920).  The system was
brutally recalibrated by the impact of the First World War and the Irish Revolution. The
latter eliminated the most troublesome of the ‘Four Nations’ and ‘quarantined’ whatever
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remained of the ‘Irish Question’ in British politics.51 In the 1930s a new series of external
emergencies and formidable enemies in the shape of Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese
ensured the further strengthening of a centralized of Union. Thus, if the ‘world wars’ of
the eighteenth century made possible and necessary the Union between England and
Scotland, the twentieth-century ‘Thirty Years War’ provided the system with a new lease
of life.52 However, none of the regional/national problems which had troubled the Union
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ABSTRACTS
From 1885 to 1921 United Kingdom politics were polarized around the question of parliamentary
devolution for Ireland (Home Rule). A major argument against Home Rule was that it would have
been incompatible with the survival of the British Empire and indeed of the United Kingdom,
because  sovereignty  could  not  be  divided.  However,  Home Rule  supporters  insisted  that  the
proposal was in the Irish national interest. This claim was in itself divisive in Ireland, as well as
within the United Kingdom as a whole,  and set the South against Ulster,  which by 1912 was
(literally) up in arms against any idea of weakening or diluting the Union with Britain. By 1887
Liberals in both Scotland and (soon afterwards) in Wales started to campaign for their own form
of Home Rule. Ostensibly only an ‘Irish’ question, Home Rule was in fact the beginning of a wider
debate  about  the  governance  of  the  United  Kingdom and the  tension between a  centralized
political system and the claims of ethnic groups and distinct regions in a multi-national state.
This article examines the wider significance of the crisis in the constitutional rebalancing of a
liberal, but still undemocratic, state. It will start from the time when the British system was at its
apex, between 1707 and 1885. In this period parliament provided social and cultural legitimacy
for the centralization of power and created cohesion for the wider imperial project. Second, this
article focuses on the advent of  democracy from 1885,  and the way the latter made it  more
difficult for parliament to agree on the ‘national’ interest – especially when the latter depended
on finding common ground between four nations.
De  1885  à  1921,  la  vie  politique  britannique  fut  dominée  par  la  question  de  la  dévolution
parlementaire pour l’Irlande (Home Rule). Un des arguments contre le Home Rule fut qu’une telle
mesure serait incompatible avec la survie de l’Empire britannique et aussi celle du Royaume-Uni
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parce que la souveraineté britannique ne pouvait être divisée. Cependant, les partisans du Home
Rule soutenaient que la proposition était dans l’intérêt national de l’Irlande. Cette revendication
divisait l’Irlande ainsi que le Royaume-Uni dans son ensemble et opposa le sud de l’Irlande à
l’Ulster  qui,  en  1912,  avait  littéralement  pris  les  armes  contre  l’idée  d’affaiblir  ou  de  diluer
l’Union avec la Grande-Bretagne. En 1887, les libéraux en Écosse puis au Pays de Galles s’étaient
lancés  dans  une  campagne  visant  à  obtenir  leur  propre  forme d’autonomie  législative.  Si  la
question du Home Rule fut à l’origine ostensiblement un problème irlandais, elle devint le sujet
d’un plus vaste débat concernant non seulement la gouvernance du Royaume-Uni mais aussi les
tensions provoquées par l’existence d’un système politique centralisé d’une part et, d’autre part,
l’expression de revendications de la part de groupes ethniques vivant dans des régions distinctes
au sein d’un état multinational. Cet article examine le sens plus large pris par la question du
Home Rule pendant une période de rééquilibrage constitutionnel dans un état certes libéral mais
encore non-démocratique. L’étude démarre au moment où le système politique britannique était
à son apogée, entre 1707 et 1885. A cette époque le parlement donnait une légitimité sociale et
culturelle à la centralisation du pouvoir et apportait une cohésion au plus vaste projet impérial.
L’article se concentre ensuite sur l’avènement de la démocratie à partir de 1885 et sur la façon
dont  celui-ci  compliqua  la  tâche  du  parlement  lorsqu’il  s’agissait  de  s’entendre  sur  l’intérêt
 « national », en particulier lorsque ceci impliquait de trouver un terrain d’entente commun à
quatre nations. 
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